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[Crim. No. 6846. In Bank. Nov. 16, 1961.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff a.nd Respondent, v. STANLEY 
WILLIAM FITZGERALD, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Bomicide-Instructions-Verdict.-The court did not err in 
instructing the jury that it must either acquit defendant of 
the charge of murder or find him guilty of first degree murder 
as against the objection that the jury might conceivably have 
found him innocent of robbery but criminally responsible for 
the victim's death and that, under proper instructions, he 
might have been convicted of a lesser crime than first degree 
murder, where this possibility was foreclosed by the jury's 
verdict of guilty on the charge of robbery, the victim's com-
panion testified that defendant killed the victim during the 
course of the robbery, and, j.n finding defendant guilty of both 
robbery and murder, the jury necessalily determined that the 
killing was perpetrated during commission of the robbery. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 235; [2] Criminal Law, 
§475; [3] Homicide, §111; [4] Criminal Law, §1363; [5] Crim-
inal Law, § 287(3); [6, 9, 10] Criminal Law, § 816; [7] Criminal 
Law, §459; [8] Criminal Law, §443; [11] Criminal Law, §1434; 
[12] Criminal Law, § 1407(7); [13] Criminal Law, § 1092; [14] 
Criminal Law, § 264; [15] Criminal Law, § 337. 
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[2] Criminal Law - Evidence - Confessions - Proof. - Oral con-
fessions and admissions, not in writing and signed by defend-
ant, may be proved by the testimony of any person who was 
present and heard the declarations when they were made. 
[S] Homicide-Evidence-Statements of Accused.-Extrajudicinl 
declarations made by defendant to the sheriff in a murder and 
robbery case were properly admitted where there was ample 
evidence that they were voluntary, defendant made no objec-
tion to their admission, and, when the sheriff was questioned, 
defendant's counsel rejected the prosecutor's invitation to 
examine the sheriff as to whether defendant's declarations 
were voluntary. 
[4] Criminal Law-Appeal-Ha.rmless Error-Order of Proof-
Rebuttal.-Although the prosecution in a murder and robbery 
ease should have introdueed certain extrajudicial and incrimi-
nating declarations of defendant as part of its case in chief, 
their admission as rebuttal did not prejudice defendant where 
there was no claim that there was any surprise, and where, 
even if objection had been made, the trial court would not 
have abused its discretion by admitting the evidence in re-
buttal. 
[5] Id. - Order of Proof - Rebuttal. - Evidence of extrajudicial 
statements by defendant, introduced after he has taken the 
stand, is not limited to impeachment of defendant, but may 
be considered as proof of the People's ease. 
[6] Id.-Instructions-Admissions and Confessions.-The court in 
a murder and robbery ease did not "label" defendant's extra-
judicial declarations as a confession where part of an instruc-
tion defined confessions and the other part defined admissions, 
and the court left to the jury their classification, as well as 
the weight to be given them regardless of their classification. 
[7] Id.-Evidence-Confessions-Definition.-A confession leaves 
nothing to be determined in that it is a declaration of defend-
ant's intentional participation in a criminal act. 
[8] Id. - Evidence - Admissions - Definition. - An admission is 
merely a recital of facts that tend to establish guilt. 
[9] Id.-Instructions-Admissions and Confessions.-The court in 
a murder and robbery case correctly instructed the jury that, 
to be considered a confession, a statement must be one which, 
if true, discloses defendant's guilt of the crime and excludes 
the possibility of a reasonable inference to the contrary, and 
that· an admission is a declaration which, by itself, is not 
sufficient, even if true, to warrant an inference of guilt, but 
[2] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 430; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 530 
et seq. 
[7] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 421; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 478. , 
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which tends to prove guilt when considered with the rest of the 
evidence, where defendant's declarations conld properly be 
regarded as confessions of robbery and assault with a deadly 
weapon, but only admissions to the charge of murder. 
[10] Id.-Instructions-Admissions.-It is improper to instruct the 
. jury that an admission can be considered, even if involuntary. 
[11] IeL-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions---Admissions.-
Error in instructing the jury in a murder and robbery case 
that an admission could be considered, even if involuntary, 
was not prejudicial where there was no substantial evidence 
in the record to support defendant's contention that the dec-
larations were involuntary, and there was testimony of both 
defendant and the sheriff, to whom the declarations were made, 
that they were free and voluntary. 
[12] Id.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting 
Attorney.-Where the prosecutor in a murder and robbery 
ease referred to defendant's having "stolen" a ear for a trip 
to Reno, and defendant properly objected, the court's cor-
rection of the prosecutor and indication to the jury that the 
reference was improper precluded any prejudice therefrom. 
[IS] IeL - Appeal- Objections - Conduct of Counsel. - Any im-
propriety of the prosecutor during his cross-examination of 
defendant in a murder and robbery case in implying that 
defendant had lied to the owner of a ear concerning the 
presence of the murder weapon in the glove compartment, that 
the prosecutor implied that defendant had stolen the gun 
from another friend, and that, by his statements on several 
occasions, the prosecutor evinced a personal dislike for or 
mistrust of defendant could have been cured, on timely ob-
jection, by retraction of the prosecutor or instruction of the 
court. 
[14] Id.-Trial-Daily Transcript.-It was not error for the pro~e­
cutor to secure a daily transcript, whereas defendant was not 
provided with such a transcript, where defendant was given 
a transcript as soon as he requested it. 
[15] Id.-Jury-Separation-Before Submission of Cause.-De-
fendant has the burden of demonstrating that improper in-
fluence and prejudice resulted from conversations between 
jurors and spectators and members of the sheriff's office before 
submission of the case to the jury, and where defendant does 
not know what the alleged conversations were about it cannot 
be presumed that they related to the trial or that the jurors 
were influenced by them. 
APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of Nevada 
County Rnd from an order denying a new trial. Vernon Stoll, 
Judge. Affirmed. 
) 
) 
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Prosecution for murder and robbery. Judgment of con-
viction imposing the death penalty, affirmed. 
Perry M. Farmer, under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, for Defendant and Appellant . 
. Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, Assist-
ant Attorney General, and Raymond M. Momboisse, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant was convicted of murder in the 
first degree, and the jury fixed the penalty at death. Defend-
ant's motion for a new trial was denied. This appeal is auto-
matic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) 
In a San Francisco bar on the evening of August 2, 1960, 
defendant overheard M. J. Young and George Bonn, the 
deceased, discuss a possible trip to Reno, Nevada, to gamble. 
He offered to drive them there, and they left San Francisco 
the following morning in a car driven by defendant that he 
had obtained from a friend. 
Several miles east of Truckee they left the main highway. 
Defendant testified that he suggested the detour to show the 
other two men a good deer hunting area. Young testified that 
defendant said he wanted to find a certain ranch to see a 
prospective purchaser of a tractor. 
Young's testimony and defendant's are in sharp conflict as 
to what happened after they finally stopped. According to 
Young, defendant took a .22 caliber pistol from the glove 
compartment of the car, forced Bonn and Young to removc 
their trousers, and then rifled their pockets. Several hours 
later, as defendant was making ready to leave the scene of the 
robbery, Bonn struck him from behind with a whiskey bottle, 
and Young attempted to seize the gun. Defendant, dazed but 
not unconscious, shot Young in the hand and thigh and shot 
Bonn several times. Bonn died as a result of the bullet wounds. 
According to defendant, all three men did some target 
shooting with the pistol during the journey over the side 
roads. After making the last stop, Bonn proposed that the 
three go swimming. Young and Bonn got undressed, and 
defendant began to disrobe. Young took some pills that he 
said were" better" than whiskey and offered one to defendant. 
Both Bonn and Young made homosexual advances that de-
fendant rejected. As he was showing Young the proper way 
to load the pistol, something struck defendant and knocked 
) 
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him out.. When he regained consciollsness, deff>ndant saw that 
Bonn had been shot to death and t.hat Young had been 
wounded. Defendant offered no explanation for these circum-
stances other than that he might have done the shooting 
unconsciously. Young then suggested that the scene be staged 
to look like a robbery. He gave defendant all his valuables, 
including two checks. They removed Bonn's wristwatch. De-
fendant left for Reno after Young had indicated that he 
would tell the police that he and Bonn had been held up by 
two strangers. Young's incentive for the false story was to 
prevent police discovery of certain pills and other parapher-
nalia in his bag. 
Defendant cashed the two checks in Reno by forging Young's 
signature. He then went by plane to Oakland, using the name 
William Boyd. He registered in an Oakland hotel as Morgan 
York. The next day he went by plane to Portland, using the 
name HM. York." He was apprehended in Portland on Sep-
tember 22, 1960, and was taken to the Nevada County jail. 
He and several other prisoners broke jail, but were recaptured. 
Defendant contends that the court erred in refusing to give 
his requested instruction concerning criminal intent. This 
instruction, however, was given almost verbatim.1 
[1] Defendant contends that the court also erred in 
SDefendant's requested instruction reads: 
"An essential element of the crime of lI'"hich the defendant is accused 
is intent, the law requiring that to constitute such a crime tbere must 
exist a union or joint operation of criminal conduct and criminal intent. 
However, this does not mean that one must intend all the consequences 
of his conduct, or that be must know that such conduct is unlawful, to 
be guilt,. of a public offense such as that charged against the de/eruJant 
in this clJ8e. The intent to do the forbidden thing constitutes the 
crinlinal intent. The lall'". requires that to be guilt,. of crime, one must 
intend the conduct that fits the description of the crime and must engage 
in that conduct knowingl,. and wilfull;y." (Italics added.) 
The instruction given reads: 
"An essential element of each crime of which the defendant is ac.eused 
is intent, the law requiring that to constitute such a crime there must 
exist a union or joint operation of criminal conduct and criminal intent. 
However, this does not mean that one must intend all the consequences 
of his conduct, or that he must know that such conduct is unlawful to 
be guilt,. of a public offense such as that charged in Oount two 0/ the 
iruJictment herein. The intent to do the forbidden thing constitutes the 
criminal intent. The law requires that to be guilty of crime, one must 
intend the conduct that fits the description of the crime and must engage 
in that conduct knowingly and wilfully." (Italics added.) 
The variation of the proposed instruction from that given appears 
from a comparison of the words in italics. Dcfendant'8 suggestion that 
the jury was misled by the reference in thc instruction given to Count 
two of the indictment is without merit, inasmuch as the instruction 
expressl,. applied to "each crime of wbich the defendant is accused .••. " 
) 
) 
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instructing the jury that it must either acquit defendant of 
the eharge of murdet: or find him guilty of murder in the first 
degree. lIe reasons that the jury might conceivably llRve 
found him innocent of robbery but criminally responsible for 
nonn's death, and that under proper instructions he might 
have been convicted of a lesser crime than murder in the first 
degree. This possibility was foreclosed, however, by the jury's 
verdict of guilty on the charge of robbery. There is no evidence 
. in the record, as there was in People v. Carni1le, 41 Ca1.2d 
384 [260 P.2d 16], that defendant formed the intent to commit 
robbery, if at all, only after the fatal shooting. Young testified 
that defendant killed Bonn during the course of the robbery. 
Defendant testified that there was no robbery. Accordingly, 
it is clear that in finding defendant guilty of both robbery and 
murder the jury necessarily determined that the killing was 
perpetrated during the commission of the robbery. 
Defendant contends that the court erroneously admitted 
certain extrajudicial declarations made by him. Sheriff Wayne 
Brown testified for the prosecution on rebuttal that shortly 
after his arrest in Portland defendant had stated that he had 
forced Bonn and Young to disrobe and robbed them at gun-
point, but that he had been struck from behind and could not 
explain his victims' wounds. Defendant urges that it was 
improper to introduce this evidence through the testimony of 
the sheriff; that no foundation was laid that the declarations 
were voluntary; that it was improper to permit the introduc-
tion of the declarations in rebuttal; that the declarations could 
only be used to impeach defendant; and that the court errone-
ously instructed the jury with respect to the declarations. 
The testimony of the sheriff was admissible. [2] Oral 
confessions and admissions, not in writing and signed by the 
defendant, may be proved by the testimony of anyone who 
was present and heard the declarations when they were made. 
(People v. Luis, 158 Cal. 185, 193 [110 P. 580]; People v. 
Cokahnour, 120 Cal. 253, 254 [52 P. 505] ; People v. Taylor, 
59 Cal. 640, 651; People v. Ashcraft, 138 Cal.App.2d 820, 828 
(292 P.2d 676] ; People v. Thompson, 133 Cal.App.2d 4, 9 [284 
P.2d 39] ; see also Gray v. State, 181 Md. 439 [30 A.2d 744] ; 
McBaine, California Evidence Manual, § 858, pp. 291-292; 2 
Wharton's Criminal Evidence, § 361, pp. 68-69.) 
[ 3] Sheriff Brown was specifically questioned as to th4 
conditions under which defendant made the declarations. 
There is ample evidence that they were voluntary. Defendant 
made no objection to their admission. Indeed, when Sheriff 
) 
) 
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Brown was questioned on this matter, counsel for defendant 
rejected the prosecutor's invitation to examine the sheriff as to 
whether defendant's declarations were voluntary. There is 
no merit in defendant's contention that no foundation was 
laid. (See People v. Byrd, 42 Ca1.2d 200,210 [266 P.2d 505].) 
[ 4] Although the prosecution should have introduced this 
evidence as part of its case in chief (see Pen. Code, § 1093; 
People v. Oarter, 48 Cal.2d 737, 753 [312 P.2d 665]), it does 
not appear that the order of proof prejudiced defendant. 
There is no claim that there was any surprise, and even if 
an objection had been made, the trial court would not have 
abused its discretion by admitting the evidence in rebuttal. 
(People v. Ohessman, 52 Ca1.2d 467, 493 [341 P.2d 679].) 
[ 5 ] Furthermore," defendant is mistaken in his contention 
that because the evidence of such statements was introduced 
after he had taken the stand it could be considered only to 
impeach defendant, not as proof of the People's case." 
(People v. Chessman, supra, p. 493.) 
[6] Defendant contends that the trial court erred in 
labeling his declarations a confession. The part of the instruc-
tion cited by defendant defines confessions. The remainder of 
the instruction, however, goes on to define admissions. The 
. court did not "label" defendant's declarations; but left to 
the jury their classification, as well as the weight to be given 
them regardless of their classification. 
Defendant contends that the court gave an inaccurate defi-
nition of a confession. [7] A confession "leaves nothing 
to be determined, in that it is a declaration of his [defendant's] 
intentional participation in a criminal act." (People v. Ferdi-
nand, 194 Cal. 555,568-569 [229 P. 341].) [8] An admis-
sion, on the other hand, is merely a recital of facts that "tend 
to establish guilt." (People v. Schoon, 177 Cal. 678,683 [171 
P. 680].) [9] The court instructed the jury that to be 
considered a confession, a statement must be one "which, if 
true, discloses his [defendant's] guilt of that crime and ex-
cludes the possibility of a reasonable inference to the con-
trary. " The court defined an admission as a declaration which, 
"by itself, is not sufficient, even if true, to warrant an infer-
ence of guilt, but which tends to prove guilt when considered 
with tIle rest of the evidence." The court was correct in 
instructing the jury with respect to both confessions and 
admissions, for defendant's del'larations might properly havc 
been regarded as confessions to the crimes of robbery and 
) 
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assault with a deadly weapon, but merely admissions to the 
charge of murder. 
[10] Defendant correctly points out that the court erred 
in instructing the jury that an admission could be considered, 
even if involuntary. (People v. Trout, 54 Ca1.2d 576, 586 
[6Cal.Rptr. 759, 354 P.2d 231] ; People v. Atchley, 53 Ca1.2d 
160,170 [346 P.2d 764].) [11] This error was not preju-
dicial, however, for there is no substantial evidence in the 
record to support defendant's contention that the declarations 
were involuntary. Sheriff Brown testified that defendant's 
answers were given freely and voluntarily. Defendant's testi-
mony does not substantially contradict that of the sheriff: 
Q. Were you forced to answer their questions T A. No. 
Q. Was everything you said free and voluntary' A. Yes. 
Q. They didn't threaten you with anything' A. In a way. 
Q. Pardon me Y A. In a way. 
Q. What did they threaten you with if anything T A. They 
said if I would go along and play ball with them they would 
make the trip as easy for 1ne as possible, I wouldn't be hand-
cuffed on the train or if we went on a plane I wouldn't be 
handcuffed. I said, "You would have to know me better." 
I said, ' , You would know I have never been in any violence. " 
Q. They didn't promise to do this on the basis of any particu-
lar story that you would tell Y A. They inferred that I would,-
how I answered the questions was how I would go back. 
On redirect examination, defendant said: "I had the choice 
of two, of answering some of these questions and going on 
the train or by plane." Sheriff Brown testified that the dis-
cussion concerning the mode of travel from Portland to 
Nevada City was wholly unrelated to defendant's answers to 
the questions put. In view of the testimony of both defendant 
and Sheriff Brown that the declarations were free and volun-
t.ary, it is not reasonably probable that the jury accepted 
defendant's contention tbat they were induced by the dis-
cussion as to the mode of travel. 
Defendant contends that misconduct of t.he prosecuting at-
torney deprived him of a fair trial. A number of instances 
are relied upon to support the charge of misconduct. [12] In 
only one instance, however, did defendant object. When the 
prosecutor referred to defendant's having "stolen" the car 
for the trip to Reno, defendant properly objected. The court's 
correction of the prosecutor and indication to the jury that the 
reference was improper precluded any prejudice tl1erefrom. 
[13] Defendant complains that during his cross-examina-
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tion of defendant, the prosecutor implied that defendant had 
lied to the owner of the car concerning the presence of the 
murder weapon in the glove compartment; that the prosecutor 
implied that defendant had stolen the gun from another friend; 
and" that by his statements on several occasions, the prosecutor 
evinced a personal dislike for or distrust of defendant. Any 
impropriety in these instances could have been cured, upon 
timely objection, by retraction of the prosecutor or instruction 
of the court. (See People v. Berryman, 6 Ca1.2d 331, 337 [57 
P.2d 136] ; People v. Lyons, 50 Cal.2d 245, 262 [324 P.2d 556] ; 
People v. Avery, 35 Ca1.2d 487,493 [218 P.2d 527]; People v. 
Oaetano,29 Cal.2d 616, 619-620 [177 P.2d 1].) 
[14] There is no merit in defendant's contention that 
there was error because the prosecutor used the power of his 
office to secure a daily transcript, whereas defendant was not 
provided with such a transcript. Defendant was given a 
transcript as soon as he requested it. 
[16] Defendant complains that there were conversations 
between jurors and spectators and members of the sheriff's 
office before the submission of the case to the jury. The burden 
of demonstrating improper influence and prejudice is upon 
the defendant. (People v. Erno, 195 Cal. 272, 283 [232 P. 
710].) Defendant does not know what the alleged conversa- " 
tions were about, and it cannot be presumed that they related 
to the trial or that the jurors were influenced by them. 
(People v. Dunne, 80 Cal. 34, 36 [21 P. 1130].) 
The judgment and the order denying defendant's motion 
"for a new trial are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J.; McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J., 
"and Dooling, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
13, 1961. 
